The heavy blow that Aleksandar Vučić's state party received in Sunday's elections in Serbia has reopened a debate that has been raging here for a long time, whether it is possible to get rid of an autocratic regime through elections. The diverse list of Serbian students, made up of professors, athletes, farmers and doctors, is thought to have won 135-140 deputies in a parliament with 250 seats, thus creating the illusion that the scores with a clique of usurpers can be settled through the ballot box.
The 13-year-old Serbian progressive government had all the tools at its disposal to prevent the rotation. They controlled the country's economic life and had far more money at their disposal than their competitors, who followed the tactic of meeting voters door to door. They had strong connections with criminal groups, which they used to fight with masks and clubs against protesters who had been marching tirelessly for two years in the streets of Belgrade, Novi Sad and smaller cities. They dominated a media apparatus of TV and newspapers, public and private, that carried out the autocrat's propaganda from morning to night. They had put under the hooves of polling companies, most of which, until the last few days, had predicted a race with a photo finish and not the clear result that we see before our eyes today.
Then the question arises: How was Vučić's downfall possible? Is a new, credible opposition, a popular mobilization enough to win elections that are not free, fair and equal, as they always are under an autocratic regime? Of course not! Serbia is a typical example of how this type of power cannot be defeated in normal ways, that the method to fight it is not to run after the elections, like a bull after a red rag, but to weaken, delegitimize and subjugate it, through methods that are for the most part considered illegal or violent by the ruling class.
Në fakt, për të kuptuar mrekullinë e këtij 25 tetori, nuk mjafton të shohësh vetëm rezultatin që po del nga kutitë, por gjithë trajektoren dyvjeçare të një përplasjeje epike. Që kur në nëntorin e 2024-ës, rënia e një strehe stacioni treni në Novi Stad shkaktoi 16 viktima, vendi ynë fqinj nuk gjeti paqe. Studentët të mbështetur më pas edhe nga qytetarët bllokuan akset kryesore të vendit, u treguan të gatshëm të përleshen me policinë, poushtuan universitetet, dogjën selitë e partisë në pushtet. Ata iu rezistuan persioneve të shumta, shkopave të gomës, gazit lotësjellës, makinave me ujë dhe topave shurdhues. Ata u kacafytën me paramilitarët e maskuar dhe iu përgjigjën dhunës së tyre me dhunë. Ata i përqeshën etiketimet e Vuçiçit, që ngjajnë si dy pika uji me ato të Edi Ramës sot. Edhe autokrati serb i akuzoi kundërshtarët e tij si nazistë, pastaj se i shërbejnë interesave të huaja, më tej se po duan të zbrapsin përparimin e vendit, duke i tallur se janë pak dhe të pa organizuar. Përgjigjja që ata shtruan para shoqërisë qe e qartë, ose zgjidhni të ardhmen e Serbisë, ose zgjidhni mafien.
Ky dyluftim i fortë, herë paqësor e herë i dhunshëm, herë masiv e herë më pak i tillë, filloi ta gryejë pushtetin e autokratit serb. Vuçic u bë i pabesueshëm pasi vendosi ta identifikojë veten me kombin dhe ta shiste si të vetmin përparim për të ardhmen e tij. Ai u bë qesharak kur i vizatoi ata studentë xhenuinë si “terrorisë”, “fashistë”, “tradhëtarë”. Ai e humbi besimin si faktor stabiliteti kur nuk arriti ti mposhtë dot, as me dhunën e policisë, as me shkopat e paramilitarëve që dilnin në qytet për të goditur të rinjtë. Atij iu rrënua kulti i pathyeshmërisë, kur demostruesit guxuan ti digjnin selitë e PSP-së dhe kur ata pushtuan universitetet duke u bashkuar dhe me pedagogët.
Pra, po ta ndjekësh hap pas hapi trajektoren e këtij revolucioni serb ajo nuk është thjeshtë historia e një autokrati që rrëzohet përmes zgjedhjesh, por përpjekja e një beteje të përditshme, shpesh të ashpër dhe të dhunshme, shpesh inteligjente dhe paqësore, për ta grryer, mpakur, tkurur e telendisur pushtetin e tij. Në 25 tetorin e tanishëm u arrit vetëm pas këtij procesi dy vjeçar që u desh, po aq sa për të grisur përfundimisht kartolinën e propagandës së Vuçiçit edhe sa për të vrarë frikën duke rrëzuar mitin e njeriut që mbështetet nga të fortët.
In this sense, the Serbian miracle can serve as a user manual for anyone who has embraced, here in our country, first the flamingo revolution, and then its inevitable radical turn. All those who want its success do not have to be seduced by the deceptive sirens of those who preach that students should create parties, that flamingos should choose representatives to dialogue with the government, since in a democracy everything is decided only through elections. The example that comes to us from Belgrade is that, yes, elections will be reached one day, but that first of all we must continue on the path started in Tirana. That of shaking the regime day after day, that of provocation to reveal its most criminal and insane side to everyone, that of clashing, to weaken it as much as possible, before it reaches the ballot boxes. Our autocrat, who has been paying the same spin doctors as his Slavic brother for years, has so far pursued the same wrong responses as Vučić. He has equated himself with the state, embraced conspiracy theories of a foreign hand, denigrated the protesters and used the most violent means at his disposal to crush the demonstrators. But this has produced only one effect, the final collapse of the facade as a democrat and, on the other hand, the killing of fear by his violence. Therefore, we are today, more or less like Serbia of about a year or two ago, and if we know how to follow the same path more resolutely, then our regime can collapse on its own, without having any parties competing in the elections, but simply from a list of professors, doctors, or craftsmen simply elected by student representatives, whose merit was that they so enraged Vučić's clique that they turned the elections into almost a formality.
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